Abstract-The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in cloud computing requires quick absorption of attack data. DDoS attack mitigation is usually achieved by dynamically scaling the cloud resources so as to quickly identify the onslaught features to combat the attack. The resource scaling comes with an additional cost which may prove to be a huge disruptive cost in the cases of longer, sophisticated, and repetitive attacks. In this work, we address an important problem, whether the resource scaling during attack, always result in rapid DDoS mitigation? For this purpose, we conduct real-time DDoS attack experiments to study the attack absorption and attack mitigation for various target services in the presence of dynamic cloud resource scaling. We found that the activities such as attack absorption which provide timely attack data input to attack analytics, are adversely compromised by the heavy resource usage generated by the attack. We show that the operating system level local resource contention, if reduced during attacks, can expedite the overall attack mitigation. The attack mitigation would otherwise not be completed by the dynamic scaling of resources alone. We conceived a novel relation which terms "Resource Utilization Factor" for each incoming request as the major component in forming the resource contention. To overcome these issues, we propose a new "Scale Inside-out" approach which during attacks, reduces the "Resource Utilization Factor" to a minimal value for quick absorption of the attack. The proposed approach sacrifices victim service resources and provides those resources to mitigation service in addition to other co-located services to ensure resource availability during the attack. Experimental evaluation shows up to 95 percent reduction in total attack downtime of the victim service in addition to considerable improvement in attack detection time, service reporting time, and downtime of co-located services.
INTRODUCTION
C YBER threat incidents are increasing day-by-day with changing attack vectors. As per the attack report in [1] , among the large number of attacks, DDoS attack is one of the most prominent attack, which has affected a majority of organizations across the globe. The maximum DDoS attack size, which was only 8 Gbps in 2004, has now increased well above 800 Gbps in the year 2016 as per [2] . The effects and origins of DDoS attacks saw a tremendous variation in terms of attack scale, sources, duration, repetition and sophistication. On the other hand, after the evolution of utility computing models, services such "DDoS for Hire" [3] and "DDoS Mitigation as a Service" [4] , [5] are available in the market to shape DDoS attacks and their mitigation as opponents in the "cyber war". Surveys such as [6] suggest that a major portion of the DDoS defense mechanisms are based on the incoming traffic feature assessment. Defense methods primarily work on-line and perform a threshold based anomaly detection on the incoming traffic which may follow history-based learning of past attacks.
As per [7] , [8] , attack data absorption is an important milestone before triggering any analytical threat intelligence activity. Many of the recent DDoS solutions such as [9] , [10] for cloud services are based on the dynamic resource scaling which advocate to use quick deployment of enormous resources to absorb the attack as quickly as possible. These solutions achieve the quick attack absorption by minimizing the attack surface. However, as per [11] , the cost implications of the resource scaling can be against the sustainability of the organizations in case of budgetary limitations or specially in case of persistent, stealthy or repetitive attacks.
During massive and extreme DDoS attacks, the resources of victim services, are stressed heavily. Recent contributions such as [12] demonstrates that the effects of the attack depend upon the target application resource usage, as the attacks may result into an extreme resource contention which may affect the attack absorption and subsequent threat mitigation adversely. In this work, we show that the resource contention may be extremely severe such that the mitigation methods may not get the required resources to perform the necessary processing in time. Additionally, the attacks may also affect other non-target co-located services on the same victim operating system which might be very critical for the recovery and monitoring (e.g., a remote login utility). To showcase the observations made in this work, we do extensive attack experiments on various kinds of victim applications with resource scaling in place. We observe some important behaviors related to the attack absorption and the attack mitigation. The primary observation of our work is related to the resource scaling which may also become less effective if the contention is formed during the attack.
The major component of the heavy resource contention is the "Resource Utilization Factor" for each incoming request. We show that minimizing the "Resource Utilization Factor" during the attack solves the issues related to the contention. We argue that during the attack downtime, the easy availability of the basic resources such as CPU, memory, disk, and bandwidth results into quick attack absorption and subsequent attack mitigation processes. We propose a novel mechanism to lower down the "Resource Utilization Factor" by doing in-resource scaling ("Scale Inside Out") of the victim application during the attack. The major idea behind our proposed approach is to sacrifice the victim service resources during downtime to expedite the overall attack absorption and attack mitigation processes. We also provide a formal model of attack absorption and outline its major requirements in this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the relationship between cyber threat intelligence and attack absorption in attack mitigation. We show our initial attack experiments to prepare the requirements of effective mitigation based on the important observations in the attack outcomes in Section 3. We give a formal model of resource utilization factor and its role in the attack mitigation process in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe the proposed approach and its detailed working. We give experimental evaluation in Section 6. Section 6 also provides a detailed discussion on the outcomes and their applicability. We provide an analysis of the related work in Section 7. Finally, we conclude our work with a light on the future work in Section 8.
CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE IN THE CLOUD
In Fig. 1 , we present a generic information flow diagram showing the DDoS attack source, participants, target infrastructure and cyber threat intelligence to combat any possible attacks. DDoS attacks are normally coordinated by a command and control (C & C) server which may control a large number of possible attack sources in the form of botrun zombie computers. The attack sources may include phones, servers, desktops, PDAs, cloud VMs, and more recently Internet of Things (IoT) devices. After the emergence of cloud computing, there are attack incidents in which bots utilizing cloud resources (BotClouds) were hired to originate such attacks [13] . As per report in [1] , most of the recent DDoS attacks are reflection and amplification attacks which also include DDoS attacks on many popular cloud services. The share of cloud based services has reached a considerable mark of 33 percent [1] among all the attack victim services worldwide. The victim services on clouds run on top of virtual machines (VMs) in a multi-tenant virtualized environment. Cloud services show additional DDoS attack effects due to their multi-tenant nature and on-demand computing and pricing based business model [6] . These additional attack effects include economic losses and a number of collateral damages on non-targets [14] . Cyber threat intelligence for DDoS attacks may intend to provide a complete security framework which involves implementing methods to prevent, detect and recover from DDoS attacks.
Input to Threat Intelligence
Detection methods are mostly functions used to identify patterns in the incoming traffic and logs. Attack data which is mostly collected from the victim server file system/logs may be supplemented by other collected data from other parts of the overall network. Additional important inputs to the threat intelligence include security analytics in the form of security knowledge based updates about the newer threats and methods. Additional resources in the form of on-demand computational, storage and bandwidth resources might also be provided as inputs to quickly perform the attack analytics, associated computation, maintain the availability, and the attack absorption and recovery. In many of the large scale and sophisticated attacks, manual human intervention is also required to achieve the goals of threat intelligence. Attack absorption is one of the most important aspect for our work and a key ingredient to the success of timely and efficient attack mitigation and subsequent service availability.
Threat Intelligence Outcomes
As shown in Fig. 1 , threat intelligence outcomes include identified attacks, attack sources and attack vulnerabilities. Attack mitigation methods block the attack sources to send any incoming traffic further and drop any established attack connections. Service recovery to gain availability may require some time due to a range of attack mitigation activities. If the attacks remain present for longer duration or remain undetected due to the stealthy and sophisticated nature, service recovery may get delayed further. We show in Fig. 1 about additional outcomes in the form of new and incremental "threat knowledge" which updates the existing knowledge base of threat intelligence. To extend our discussion towards the major findings of our work, we expand the discussion of the generic cyber threat intelligence towards real attack analytics. We now detail the real attack experimental study with critical aspects of attack absorption, mitigation and recovery in Section 4.
3 REAL-TIME ATTACKS: CRITICAL ASPECTS deterministic attack detection time over multiple repetitions of the experiments. In case of multiple sources, the attack detection time varies depending upon the connection share of each attack source in the total number of established connections at victim server end. Moreover, the main focus of our experiments is on the attack absorption and subsequent attack mitigation at the victim side. The launch of the attack is motivated by [15] , where authors made important comments about the major portion of a large number of attack traces (around 12,000 traces). More than 38 percent of uniform random attack events and 46 percent of all the attack events had an estimated rate of 500 requests per second or more. We see similar attack experiments in many other contributions among other contributions such as [16] .
To demonstrate the service availability behavior of the victim service under attack, we use a host to send benign traffic by sending one concurrent request for a total of 100 requests. We are also interested to see the behavior and performance of other essential and critical services which are co-hosted with the victim service on the victim operating system. For this purpose, we design a test to assess the availability of secure shell (ssh) by sending a ssh session request, connection establishment, and session close cycle.
Our ssh test represents the communication medium by which the VM/victim service owner connects to the service. We scheduled the attack experiments in a manner such that the attack traffic, the benign traffic and the ssh requests are sent at the same time. We also aim at analyzing the performance dynamics of attack absorption and other important attack mitigation and availability aspects while the victim VM gets more resources. For this purpose, in Set 1 experiments, we provide equivalent resources to an EC2 "C4" instance [17] . A "C4.xlarge" instance offers 4 vCPUs and a memory of size 7.5 GB. In Set 2, we expand these resources to see the attack dynamics with resources twice of C4 resources. We term Set 2 resources equal to two C4 instances. We expand these services to as high as four times of C4 resources in Set 3 which are equivalent to four C4 instances. Instead of scaling the resources dynamically while the attack is present, we do three separate attack experiments to observe the effects on the service downtime, the attack detection time, and the performance of other services. We study the attack mitigation behavior by placing a generic DDoS mitigation mechanism in place.
"DDoS-Deflate" detects the attacks sources on the basis of a threshold on maximum number of connections [18] by a source. The detected attack sources are then suitably blocked by a firewall such as iptables [19] . The main motivation behind using this specific method is due to its popular and widespread use in DDoS detection. It is also a generic representation of many other DDoS mitigation methods which work on incoming traffic features. Our results and their suitability are not dependent on the DDoS mitigation tools, hence, any other similar DDoS mitigation tool can be used as a replacement. Additionally, in order to generalize the observations and their wider applicability, we use this generic connection based detection method. While performing the attack experiments, we keep a close eye on the attack absorption behavior of the victim VM and the DDoS mitigation service. We achieve this by keeping track of various metrics such as attack detection time, attack reporting time, downtime of victim service, service response time, number of attack requests served before the attack detection, downtime of ssh service, and response time behavior. One more behavior for which we are particularly interested to see the attack absorption behavior is the number of established connections during the attack period. Connection establishment depends on the server resources availability and the duration of connection cycle which consists of connection-establishment and connection-close cycle. We will detail about this important factor while discussing the attack dynamics in Section 4. Fig. 3a shows the behavior of victim service response time for the requests sent by the benign sender. As soon as the attack starts, the service reaches the downtime and the response times become very high (Table 2 ). In the experimental setting, we changed the behavior of benign sender in such a manner that it waits for the longer responses to come without getting timed out. The response time behavior is having a large downtime and huge peaks in responses in Set 1 (Fig. 3a) . Set 2 with increased resources settles the downtime from a huge 2481s to 931s which is quite similar in the case of Set 3. However, one important factor to consider related to the attack mitigation performance is attack reporting time. Set 1 and Set 2 victim VM is not responsive for the whole downtime and the reporting of attack detection time is unknown.
Observations
We configured the DDoS mitigation service to notify the attack detection in an attack log file once the attackers are identified from the traffic. However, the huge resource usage during the attack did not allow the access to VM interface and the reporting time remains unknown till all the attack effects are not over. DDoS mitigation service achieved the attack reporting in the case of Set 3 resources only.
The behavior of other co-hosted services (inside the same victim VM) as demonstrated by Fig. 3b and various performance metrics in Table 3 . The SSH service though not the real direct target of the DDoS attack, faces downtime and performance penalties in the later part of the web-service downtime. SSH service downtime and response time see a decremental trend from Set 1 to Set 3. Set 3 having the highest resources (four times the Set 1 resources) sees no downtime of the SSH service, though there are response times which are as high as thrice of the minimum response time.
In Fig. 3c , we show the total number of connections at the victim service end since the start of the attack. The number of connections remains around 500-600 for all the three sets. However, for the Set 1 and the Set 2, the number of connections are unknown as the victim VM became non-responsive and values were not retrieved after 40s-50s. Set 3 stays at $500 connections for most of the duration and then a step-wise decrease is observed till all the attack effects are over. We made the following observations during attack experiments.
1. Resource Contention during attack. Non-responsive VM, unknown attack detection time, unknown number of connections and huge peaks in SSH request-response cycles are the number of observations which are the result of a heavy resource contention formed by the DDoS attack. In addition to just service denial during the downtime, all these effects transforms these attacks in "extreme DDoS" attacks [12] . Resource contentions occur due to the heavy resource usage by the victim service and no timely resource availability to other important processes at the operating system level [12] . Resource contention and the absence of performance isolation are important issues while designing operating systems and virtual machine monitors [20] , [21] . We argue that resource contention should be minimized as this is an important effect of DDoS attacks and also a major contributor to the other three observations.
2. Downtime Post-attack Detection. The attack detection time is unknown in the cases of Set 1 and Set 2, due to the heavy resource contention. Though in Set 3, the attack detection time is around 41s. Still in Set 3, the service downtime is 971s. After detecting the attack, the DDoS mitigation service, with the help of the firewall, drops all the incoming attack connections from the identified attackers. In addition to this, the DDoS mitigation services tries to remove all the connections which are established by the attackers. Connection removal is achieved by resetting the connections by utilities such as tcpkill. Removal of these connections, also takes up a considerable amount of time due to heavy resource usage, as all these connections are already having requests which are currently processed by the victim service. In order to minimize the overall downtime, the postattack detection downtime should also be minimized.
3. Number of Connections. In all the three set of experiments, we observed a stability in the number of connections to $500-600, which is the major reason behind the high post-attack mitigation time. We also increased the environment variables such as maximum number of connections and port-ranges at the server end, still the number of connections remains stable. Number of connections decide the overall attack surface on the victim and should be maximized to absorb the attack traffic as soon as it arrives [9] .
4. Collateral Effects on Other Services. We see adverse performance on SSH service in Fig. 3b . SSH service is very light resource usage utility as compared to the co-hosted dynamic website. Still, the SSH request-response cycle is severely affected by the large resource contended downtime. We observe similar effects such as non-responsiveness of victim VM, unknown attack detection time, and unknown number of connections. Reduction in the contention may also solve these collateral damages to non-targets.
We will use the above observations in preparing the requirements for the proposed approach.
FORMALIZING DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
We formally define important requirements keeping the four important observations we made during the attack experiments in Section 3. For this purpose, we first define a typical DDoS Attack mitigation activity as a three stage process (also shown in Fig. 4) .
Stage 1. Attack Absorption. In absorption, the mitigation method tries to absorb the traffic as soon as it arrives on the network interface. Traffic input comes through the network connections and absorption gets affected if the victim service is not able to create and release connections quickly.
Stage 2. Attack Identification and Mitigation. Attack absorption is an online activity which always runs to ensure the timely traffic assessment and threat analytics. Attack identification and mitigation (blocking and dropping the attack connections) are completely causally dependent on the attack absorption. Resource availability to DDoS mitigation service and other critical services must be ensured to have resource contention free attack mitigation. Each incoming request is the contributor to the resource usage, and a huge number of requests during the DDoS attack forms the contention.
Stage 3. Post-Attack Detection to Recovery. Quick service recovery is dependent on the timely attack absorption and mitigation. Quick removal of established attack connections is the key to minimize the time required to achieve service availability post-attack detection.
The performance of the attack absorption stage is heavily dependent on the attack absorption delay. Attack absorption delay (T absorb ), which is the difference between the time at which the traffic flow reaches the victim interface (T interface ) to the time when it is actually within the reach of the DDoS mitigation service (T DMS ). We define attack absorption delay with the help of the following equation. Victim VMs are provided certain basic resources such as vCPUs (C), memory (M), disk (D) and the bandwidth (B). We define the resource allocation to a VM as its capacity.
The actual capacity of a victim server running inside the VM is usually represented by the total number of simultaneous requests it can serve at the same time. The number of requests (r) which the service will be able to serve depends upon the resource requirements of each request. We define the resource requirements of each request, r, with the help of the resource utilization factor, S r , which is the total resource requirements to complete a request r. Processing a request requires access to few or all of the basic resources.
S r ¼ <C r ; M r ; D r ; B r > :
We define the capacity of the victim VM by the following equation where the VM, V i is able to serve N max requests.
We assume that the victim service has a defined set of requirements for achieving a minimum quality of service (QoS) in order to have timely and correct response. The maximum number of requests (N max ) which can be served by the victim service with the required QoS, are given by
In order to extend the notion of resources, we also utilize the maximum number of connections (C max ) as an important resource of the victim service. We assume that we can only maximize the N max value if we are able to establish as many connections (maximizing C max ) as possible (Equation (6)).
It is also evident from Equation (5) that if we want to maximize the number of maximum requests (N max ) which can be served by the victim service, we need to either increase the CapacityðV i Þ or reduce the S r . Following are the few possible requirements of a mitigation method by which the attack absorption can be expedited: R1. T absorb Reduction. During an attack, the number of connection requests coming to the victim service are huge. The time at which the traffic reaches the interface and transforms in the form of established connections is an important delay which is actually the T absorb (attack absorption delay). For the cases where the mitigation methods filter more fine grain features, the attack absorption delay may be extended to serving the initial requests (index page) and then allowing the additional requests to enter the service. These requests might be waiting to enter the service queue or they may be even retransmissions. We argue that the delay T absorb can be minimized if the connection life-cycle and the delay in providing the incoming traffic features to the DDoS mitigation service can be reduced.
R2. S r Reduction. Resource utilization factor S r , denotes the resource usage of each incoming request processing and responding with a suitable request outcome. S r comprises of multiple activities at the service end for each incoming request. As per Equation (5), reduction in S r will lead to increase in N max and reduction in T absorb . Additionally, reduction in S r may also lead to minimizing resource contention effects, as all the three stages of mitigation process run in parallel to each other. Resource contention shows adverse effects on the parallel and similar activities [21] . R3. CapacityðV i Þ Scaling. The auto-scaling capabilities of cloud computing facilitate dynamic resource scaling, on the go, without any noticeable downtime in VM stop-resume. Capacity scaling can be achieved with the help of vertical or horizontal resource scaling as described in [22] , [23] . As described earlier the resource scaling comes with an additional cost of resources and can be huge for massive resource surge [24] . By increasing CapacityðV i Þ, it is assumed that the attack absorption will be quick and the T absorb will be minimized by increasing the N max (in turn C max ). In next Section 5, we detail our approach by addressing the above three requirements.
OUR PROPOSAL: SCALE INSIDE-OUT
We now address the attack mitigation requirements detailed in Section 4 by describing the novel solution elements incorporated in the proposed approach. The contributions of our work lie in providing quick attack mitigation by combating the four important attack observations made in the attack experiments in Section 3. We address the problem of reduction in attack absorption delay, T absorb , by reducing the resource utilization factor S r . In the client server architecture of web-services such as the one which we have used in our experiments, there is a set of server activities which are performed to serve each request. Receiving a connection request, reading the request, processing the request, preparing a reply, sending a response, and closing the connection are few essential activities which a server-end normally performs during a request-response cycle. Processing a request requires utilizing various resources such as CPU, memory, disk and the bandwidth. We show all these activities as part of the resource utilization factor in Fig. 5 . During DDoS attacks, huge number of requests to victim, create heavy resource usage. Resource utilization of these requests adds up to form the resource contention with all the basic resources such as CPU and memory. Though DDoS mitigation service in our experiments is a very low resource usage based service, still, the resource contention severely affects the overall attack mitigation process. Additionally, we saw in the attack experiments in Section 3, scaling of victim service resources to four times also does not solve the problem of attack downtime, specially the postattack mitigation downtime. Meeting requirement R3 alone does not solve the local operating system level resource contention completely and comes with an additional cost. We provide a summary of calculated costs of various web services in the form of an estimate of their resource utilization factor in Table 4 . 
Nothing; end ScaleInsideOut(V , S r ); Show "Attack Mitigated"; end We show the amount of time taken and the total number of system calls executed by the victim web service using different image sizes. We can see that the utilization of various resources is reflected in the time taken to perform the request and it increases with the size of the image. We use this fact in our novel approach "Scale Inside-out", where in addition to capacity scaling, we argue to perform an internal application scaling to reduce the resource utilization factor during a DDoS attack. We term our approach as "Scale Inside-out" as it reduces the request processing (by reducing S r ) to increase N max and C max which in turn minimize, T absorb . To achieve this goal, we skip all the activities between "read request" and "send response" as shown in Fig. 5 . By doing the reduction in S r , only during the attack period, we argue that the resource contention and all the subsequent problems like attack absorption delay, postattack mitigation downtime, and collateral damages are resolved. We show the working of this approach using Algorithms 1 and 2. We test the applicability of our method by a quick and dirty check in which we keep checking the response time of the service and the total number of connections available on the victim service. Fig. 6 shows the flow of the proposed approach. We also show the flow of the DDoS mitigation activity which progresses in parallel with the "Scale Inside-out" approach. Using this figure, we show that the proposed approach is working as a support framework to provide immediate resource help to the victim service to combat the DDoS attacks.
To demonstrate the applicability, we use thresholds T timeout and C attack which best describe the attack condition by a timeout value and the minimum number of connections during an attack. Whenever the response time becomes higher than the acceptable response time and the number of connections (C now ) become more than or equal to C attack , the "Scale Inside-out" approach changes the resource utilization factor of the victim web-service from S r to S attack . We observe the resource utilization factor changing back to its original value once the service is restored back. The major motivation behind "Scale Inside-out" approach is that during the attack downtime, it is fine to sacrifice the victim service resources to expedite all the three stages of attack mitigation if the mitigation method minimized the downtime and other effects. "Scale Inside-out" works as a supporting framework which minimizes the attack downtime and the effects on the legitimate users with an aim of working with any kind of DDoS mitigation service.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In order to analyze the efficacy of the "Scale Inside-out" (SIO) approach, we perform exhaustive real time attack experiments. We use various image sizes (2 KB, 50 KB, 100 KB, 500 KB, 1 MB, and 2 MB) and resources (Set 1, Set 2, and Set 3) and apply the "Scale Inside-out" approach to evaluate various metrics such as attack detection time, attack reporting time, service downtime, and post-attack detection time. Similarly, we collect various metrics for other critical services to observe the contention and collateral damages. The major motivation of using three sets of resources is to show the effects of capacity scaling on the mitigation performance. The experimental settings are similar to what we see in Table 1 and Fig. 2 of Section 3. We show the detailed results on effects of "Scale Inside-out" on victim web service performance in Table 5 . Table 6 shows the attack effects on SSH service. We will first describe the patterns in the results related to the victim service performance with the help of Fig. 7. Fig. 7a shows the response time behavior to the benign user while we do not employ the proposed approach for Set 1 resources. In this case, we observe that the attack detection time ('D' as shown after the vertical arrow on the graph) is not known till the attack effects are completely over. Attack reporting time ('R') and attack detection time ('D') are only observed after the victim service achieves the service availability state ('A'). The heavy resource contention also resulted in the unavailability of VM interface as well as longer peaks in the response time behavior.
On the other hand after applying the "Scale Inside-out" approach to expedite the attack mitigation, the web service response is shown by Fig. 7b . The three important metrics, the attack detection time (D), the attack reporting time (R) and the service availability time (A), are heavily reduced to around 40s. Additionally, the post-attack detection time, reduces to nearly 0s, which was quite high in the cases where we do not employ the "Scale Inside-out" approach. After the reduction of the resource utilization factor from S r to S attack , all the benign requests are given a response which is not useful for them. Therefore, the response time behavior as shown in the Table 6 shows a huge reduction in various metrics. However, the reduction in S r helps in achieving a huge reduction in the service downtime. Except the 2 KB service, which has the least S r , all the other services have a service downtime ranging between $600s-2400s.
Another important observation regarding the service downtime in the cases when "Scale Inside-out" is used, is related to the achieved stability in the service downtime to $40s. Coming to the impact of "Scale Inside-out" on the attack absorption, we show the results in the form of various graphs in Fig. 8 . With a huge reduction in the resource utilization factor from S r to S attack , the number of connections N max reaches to a value as high as $50,000 connections to absorb the attack as soon as possible.
Victim web services where the S r is already very low (2KB-100KB) show number of established connections ranging between $2,000-20,000 connections while we do not employ "Scale Inside-out". However, after employing our approach, the rise in number of connections also helps in achieving important goals of reducing the overall downtime and other related effects. We show the effects of our proposed approach on the collateral damages to other critical services in Table 7 .
For better comprehension, we show the performance of SSH test in the form of SSH response times by various graphs in Fig. 9 . Proposed approach removes the collateral effects which were formed by the victim service on SSH service. The huge peaks in the response times, specially in the cases of web services with a higher S r are reduced to acceptable values.
Additionally, it is also visible that the collateral effects on SSH service seems to disappear in case of Set 3 without employing the proposed approach. However, a close look on the maximum time taken in the request-response cycle in SSH is more than double in all the cases where we use the proposed approach. These results also prove that the capacity scaling alone may not solve all the collateral effects as the resource contention highly depends upon the application type and its resource utilization factor S r . Therefore, even the Set 3 resources may become resource contended for heavier services or attacks. However, "Scale Inside-out" always shows the stable results for various metrics for critical colocated services. In addition to all these metrics, we also show an additional metric which is quite important to understand the attack absorption dynamics. We show the number of attack requests served by the victim service under attack, before the attack is actually detected in Table 8 . This metric is important from two perspectives, first, the cost of outgoing bandwidth spent on responding to these attack requests will be huge if the attack is not detected in time.
Second, is the severity of resource contention, which remains high if the victim service keeps serving the attack requests without the mitigation service timely identifying them. The attack requests served before detection, are heavily reduced in the cases when the "Scale Inside-out" is used. In the cases of higher S r , the number of attack requests served before detection remains similar to the number of requests served after the "Scale Inside-out" as a minimum time is required to complete the quick and dirty check by the proposed approach.
On the other hand, the capacity scaling (Set 2 and Set 3) shows negative impact here as the scaled resources serve more and more requests before getting a detection trigger. After discussing the detailed results of the evaluative experiments, we will now discuss various aspects of the proposed approach. Following are various important aspects related to the "Scale Inside-out" approach and its usage.
Attack Downtime. Many of the recent DDoS attacks
show the attack downtime ranging between few days to weeks and the unavailability causes enormous losses [25] . During the downtime, the legitimate customers will not get served, hence, we utilize the idea of sacrificing the victim service resources and make the resources available for the DDoS mitigation service and other critical services. 2. Variable S r . The real web services may not always have a fixed resource utilization factor for all the requests (except in the cases of static services). In the experimentation, we change the S r to S attack in all the cases, however, variable S r values for different resource users/dependent services may be used to ensure a minimum availability during the downtime. 3. Effects on other DDoS mitigation methods. The proposed approach is independent of the DDoS mitigation method used as it aims at providing resources to the mitigation service. For most of the DDoS mitigation methods which work at the network or the application level, proposed approach will be helpful as it is able to absorb the attack data timely.
However, application layer filtering approaches which are based on more fine-grain user inputs may require additional support. 4. Attack Absorption. Our major aim and contribution in this work is to expedite the attack absorption with minimizing the attack absorption delay (T absorb ). Methods requiring additional data input in the mitigation may require other supports. 5. Attackers are not interested in response. One important argument in support of the reduction in S r , is that the attackers being mostly bots do not have any interest in the service response. However, the responses with reduced S r may trigger the bots to automatically increase/change the attack vectors (guessing that the service is not down yet). This instigation may also help the mitigation method to get the upcoming attacks quickly for quick detection. 6. Legitimate users. At first instance it may appear that the service is giving unusable responses to the benign users. However, due to a heavy reduction in downtime, the legitimate users are served right after the attack detection and minimize the overall downtime to legitimate clients. 7. Repeated/stealthy/sophisticated attacks. As discussed in point number 5, the attacks which are undetectable or requires additional efforts (at times "manual" efforts) should show reduced effects if the proposed approach is used as the S attack will be minimum during the downtime. If the attacks are repeated during the downtime, the detection will be quick as the service is already using S attack . 8. Sacrifice versus losses. In order to achieve the loss minimization and quick availability, we are applying a forceful downtime using "Scale Inside-out". The sacrifice of service resources by reducing the S r results in minimizing the losses, which are quite higher as compared to the actual losses due to the S r reduction. 9. Cost Benefit. Cost savings are complex function of downtime, scaled resources and other visible and invisible short-term and long-term reputation and business losses or effects. Our evaluation results show and use "service downtime" as the primary metric of attack mitigation methods and do not focus on other cost savings aspects which are mostly dependent upon the overall downtime only. For most of the cases shown in Table 5 , the cost savings while performing mitigation with "Scale Inside-out" is up to 95 percent which is a considerable improvement in critical environments like business, health-care and other important time-critical public services. High uptime is one of the most important features of cloud computing SLA (service level agreement) which is supported by "Scale Inside-out" approach by providing minimum yet stable downtime. 10. "Scale Inside-out" versus Shutdown. Proposed approach may look like victim service/machine shutdown, as in the case of shutdown the victim service administrator anticipates that the attack will go away soon. However, without shutting the service, we collect all the attack data and use the resources to detect and mitigate the attack as quickly as possible. Additional advantages as compared to the shutdown are as listed in other points from 1 to 9. 11. "Scale Inside-out" for Fixed infrastructure. Our proposed approach does not advocate or deny the use of scaling in the mitigation and works well with both the auto-scaling enabled approaches and fixed resource servers.
RELATED WORK
Cyber threats such as DDoS attacks remain a major research area for the cyber security community. However, the challenges posed by newer forms of DDoS attacks and their variants bringing sophistication, require new and effective solutions. DDoS attack models and defense methods are classified in the detailed surveys such as [26] . The authors in [6] and [27] gave a detailed solution taxonomy related to DDoS attack solutions for cloud computing. A detailed discussion on DDoS attacks in the cloud computing and related security assurance and protection methods are provided in contributions such as [28] and [29] . Taxonomies and surveys such as [30] provide mitigation solutions related to emerging DDoS attacks in the area of cloud computing with a special emphasis on software defined networks (SDN). Many authors also studied the novel characterization of DDoS attacks and its variants on cloud computing and advocated about the need of solutions specifically designed for the on-demand computing model of cloud. The authors in [31] show DDoS attacks on cloud data centers and observe impacts beyond the downtime of the service. The authors showed effects of attacks which may even result in switching off the victim servers and permanent hardware damages. The authors in [32] show newer DDoS attacks which result in power spikes in the data center power utilization resulting in power over-subscription by attack workloads. The authors in [33] show a discussion on DDoS attacks which target the server bandwidth to achieve the service denial. The authors in [34] provide puzzle based solution to bandwidth based DDoS attacks. The authors provide attack algorithms of novel stealthy DDoS attacks in cloud computing in contributions such as [35] , [36] . These stealthy attacks try to remain undetected by intelligently defeating the attack filters.
There are two important features which differentiate a cloud based victim service from a fixed infrastructure server. These features are on-demand "Pay-as-you-Go" model of cloud computing and multi-tenant nature of cloud infrastructure. Idziorek et. al. [37] showed a DDoS attack variant in the form of fraudulent resource consumption (FRC). The authors in [38] , [39] present solutions which are based on challenge response protocol such as CAPTCHAs to prevent the exploitation of "Pay-as-you-Go" model.
The multi-tenant nature of cloud results into a new venue of security threats among co-located VMs. The authors in [40] show security threats among VMs hosted on the same physical server. Similarly, contributions such as [41] show contention among co-located VMs at the level of I/O operations and [42] and in the network resources. Performance interference and resource contention is a well studied aspect of virtualization technology and there are number of characterization studies such as [20] . Recent DDoS characterization studies [14] extends the VM resource contention to the DDoS attacks and show collateral damages on co-hosted VMs and energy consumption and migration effects on overall cloud infrastructure. Similarly, the authors in [43] show effects of DDoS attacks on virtual machines. Since the inception of cloud computing, there were anticipations that the profound amount of resources available in the cloud infrastructure will help in immediately curbing the DDoS attack by resource scaling at victim end. There are industry solutions such as [9] , [10] which aims at minimizing the attack surface and expediting the attack absorption by resource capabilities of cloud computing to be used during an attack. Solutions such as [16] , [44] , [45] provide methods which scale the victim server resources in the attack cases till the service becomes normal. The authors in [46] presents a scaling based solution utilizing selective-server access based on the client reputation. On the other hand, the authors in [47] proposed a DDoS aware resource scaling algorithm which does not scale the resources if there is a presence of an attack.
The authors in [48] propose a moving target based mitigation mechanism in which the hidden servers and ports are assigned to create another interface between the real servers and clients. The authors in [49] proposed a cloud based moving defense scheme using victim server replication and client reassignment. Similarly, the authors in [50] proposed a solution where moving proxy servers are used to remap the clients. On the other hand, authors in [51] proposed to migrate the victim-server under attack to reserved resources in anticipation that the attack will be over soon. The authors in [52] presented a specific attack class which is known as asymmetric DDoS attacks where attackers with a limited set of resources aims to exploit a system resource on the server. The authors in this work considered the victim server application as component-based application and mitigate the attack by heavy replication of affected components.
Most of the DDoS attack solutions in the cloud computing, contributed towards resource scaling methods and other contributions show resource contention among VMs on the same physical server. Our proposed work shows a novel characterization where the local resource contention among the operating system level services (at the level of single victim VM) gets formed due to the attack. The authors in [12] showed the aspect of resource contention at the level of victim server operating system. The authors advocate to have separate isolated resources for the DDoS mitigation service to expedite the progress of mitigation activity. We extend the notion of attack mitigation to finegrain resource management activities.
We show that the attack absorption being the most important phase of attack mitigation may get delayed due to these effects where capacity scaling may not help. As per the detailed related work, we believe that our proposed work shows a new direction of DDoS mitigation and provides a novel solution based on the reduction in "resource utilization factor" per request during the attack.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we show that during massive and extreme DDoS attacks, the victim service resources get stressed heavily. The legitimate traffic coming to the victim service is not serviced during the downtime due to these attacks. In addition, collateral damages due to the heavy resource contention delays the overall mitigation process. The traffic flow in these attacks is really huge which cannot be timely absorbed by the victim machine having the limited resources. Most of the existing DDoS solutions use the dynamic scaling capabilities of cloud computing to scale service instances to absorb the attack quickly. The resource scaling capabilities provided by the profound and on-demand resources provide a great help in mitigating the attacks quickly to restore back the services. Resource scaling allows quick collection of attack features to expedite the attack detection and mitigation. The heavy resource contention created during the presence of the attack should be minimized so that the overall mitigation activity can function smoothly. In addition to the dynamic scaling of resources, we argue that a reorganization and in-resource scaling of critical bottleneck resources may fasten the overall mitigation process further. Most of the DDoS mitigation tools/frameworks rely on the incoming traffic features such as traffic rate or connections to evaluate and segregate the traffic.
We show that the mitigation activity could be expedited if the attack absorption delay, that is the time between the request arrival and request evaluation by the mitigation method can be minimized. To minimize the absorption delay, we reduce the "Resource Utilization" per request during an attack. To showcase the efficacy of our claims we also take the case of "number of connections" as a critical resource as it directly affects the overall time and efficiency of traffic data absorption during segregation process. To increase the number of connections, we propose to reconfigure the victim service to have a reduced resource utilization per request during the attack.
This essentially means that for each incoming request (during the attack), the server does not perform the requested activity which leads to the resource contention. The implementation hastens the incoming traffic arrival and evaluation since the reconfiguration results into the establishment of a huge number of connections which helps in absorbing the attack as quickly as possible. We perform real time attack experiments on cloud services to showcase the effectiveness of our scheme. The proposed scheme also works well with the services having resource/budget limitations. We also believe that our proposed technique opens up a new direction of "in-resource" scaling by which the attack data collection lead to early mitigation.
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